WikiLeaks: 2004-01-08: 04ANKARA90: Fear of Rejection Keeps Ankara from asking IGC for PKK Statement
Viewing cable 04ANKARA90, FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000090 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6 TAGS: PREL MARR PTER IZ TU SUBJECT: FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR PKK STATEMENT REF: A. CPA 423 ¶B. ANKARA 7952 (U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Deutsch. Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) DCM briefed MFA Director General for Middle East Burcuoglu on US strategy for Iraq on January 2, drawing from ref a and recent policy statements. He noted that CPA would appreciate a readout by the planned GOT fact-finding mission to Iraq (ref b) towards the end of its time there. (Burcuoglu did not provide any details on the composition or timing of this visit.) ¶2. (C) In response to the presentation, Burcuoglu said he was encouraged by most of the USG strategy, noting that "the only point of divergence" between the US and Turkey on Iraq was federalism. He repeated much of the usual GOT concerns about disproportionate Kurdish influence in the IGC and on the US, and how the Kurds were attempting to exploit their current advantages to the disadvantage of the future Iraq. He worried about recent events in Kirkuk, which could "explode" if the Kurds did not moderate their demands. He said the main message Turkey had was that the Kurds should be realistic and should not try to impose their will on other groups. ¶3. (C) Burcuoglu stated that many Sunni groups complained about a sense of lack of representation or influence in the IGC to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad (which is reporting prolifically these days). Former Foreign Minister Pachachi "has no ambition to represent the Sunnis," he said. The Turkish Ambassador had invited Pachachi to visit Turkey in late January, but he refused because the dates conflicted with the Davos meeting. There was a possibility that PM Erdogan might see him there. Regarding other visits, he said Assyrian Democratic Movement Chairman (and IGC member) Yonadan Kana would visit Ankara January 13-14. Kurdish Democratic Party chief Barzani "would be welcome in February" when he will be serving as IGC president, just as PUK leader Talabani was during his time in that position. (Comment: We understand that the Turks also invited Abdel Aziz Hakim to visit in December when he held the IGC presidency; he couldn't make it then but will instead visit Ankara the week of January 12.) ¶4. (C) DCM noted that CPA had approached the IGC to issue a statement opposing the continued presence of the PKK/KHK in Iraq, similar to what the IGC did with regards to MEK. Turkey should make a similar request, he urged. Burcuoglu responded that a negative reply to a formal request would necessitate a response. This might include closing the Iraq-Turkey border to all but OIF-related traffic. Ankara did not want to take this risk, he averred. He took note, however, of the DCM's suggestion that the Turkish mission could sound out individual IGC members in the course of their broader discussions.