Iraqi Regime (Ba'ath Party)
Top Secret Internal Memo: Plan of Action

by PBS Frontline.  The Survival of Saddam — Readings: “plan of action”

Posted: Saturday, March 29, 2003 at 06:32 AM CT

Related Information Iraqi Ba'ath Party • Founded in 1943 in Syria • Advocated Arab unity and secularism • Iraqi branch established in 1951 • Saddam joined in 1956 • Saddam came to power in Iraq through coups in 1963 & 1968 The Iraqi Ba'ath party has been one of the tools by which Saddam Hussein has ruled Iraq.  Thus, its power is expected to crumble when his regime is deposed. The party's full name, The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, was founded in Syria in the 1940s by a small group of French-educated Syrian intellectuals, led by Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar. The word Ba'ath means renaissance in Arabic. The party's ideology is pan-Arab, secular nationalism, and in the beginning, was steeped in Socialist ideology. A committed Ba'athist should see individual Arab states as regions of one larger Arab nation. The Ba'ath party also became the ruling party and political bureaucracy in Syria, a fact that led to a bitter rivalry between Damascus (Syria) and Baghdad (Iraq) rather than an alliance. Human Rights Violations Against Assyrians Saddam's Iraq Iraq Forcing Indigenous Assyrians to Flee Changing Indigenous Peoples' National Identity by a Governmental Decree Assyrians and the Insanity of Arabization Pleas of a Suffering Nation Assyrians in Contemporary Iraqi Thought

The Baghdad government issued this memo in early 1992. It details methods for Saddam's security apparatus to tighten control of the population and crush any opposition. Offering a clear view into the Orwellian police state Saddam has built, it also shows how his regime in many ways parallels the Soviet police state of Joseph Stalin, the leader Saddam most admires.

In The Name of God, The Merciful, The Compassionate
Secret and Personal
To Be Opened Personally
General Security
Al-Ta'meem Governorate Security Directorate Date : 25 Jumada II

20/1/1992 AD

To: All Department Heads, Sector Officers, and Headquarters Branches
Sub.: Plan of Action

We enclose herewith the items that require implementation, out of the plan of action for 1992 AD sent to us by General Security. Please study its contents and carry them out with all due precision. A conference shall be held for you every three months to establish the extent to which the mentioned items have been implemented, and you will be evaluated in the light of what has been carried out. The plan must be held in your personal possession, and it is prohibited to circulate it among the staff.

(signature)

Director of Ta'meem Governorate Security 20/1/1992 AD
Enclosure

Plan of Action Annual plan for 1992 from 1/1/1992 to 1/1/1993

S/311

1. Adherence to the guidelines set forth by (His Excellency the Leader President) during (his Excellency's) meeting with the Director of Intelligence, which have been circulated to you by the letter General Security no. 3895 dd. 1/1/1991.
2. Officers of the Security organs are to distance themselves from the atmosphere and relationships with business owners, contractors, and the wealthy.
3. The personal relationships between Security organ personnel and Iraqis living abroad, are to be conducted with the knowledge of their offices.
4. All Security organs personnel are obliged to distance themselves from intercession and interference in affairs related to their Security work.
5. Security organs at the airport must be exhorted to deal in a humanitarian fashion with our Egyptian and Arab brothers:
   1. To make them forget the incidents which led to their humiliation in Iraq.
   2. Insinuate to them that the incidents involving them were prompted by their governments' stance towards us.
   3. Collect accurate data pertaining to some of them, within Egypt.
   4. Imbue them with the notion that they are a substitute work force, replacing those who belong to groups opposed to the Revolution in the Central and Southern regions, and goad them into visiting places of worship and shrines, entrusting them with the collection of information about those who have opposed the Revolution and its glorious leader.
6. Instruct police and security organs to accept complaints from Egyptians and Arabs, on an equal basis with Iraqis.
7. Affirming, during secret conversations with those among them who are Baathist, that the Party's original plan, as described in its writings and theoretical origins, is still in place. This being the reduction in the percentage of populists (the Shiites) in the Republic of Iraq, as they are a stumbling block standing in the way of the Revolution's development and the achievement of its national goals. It is thus incumbent upon Arabs to comprehend this fact and to work seriously in serving Iraq and in protecting it from its enemies.
8. Affirming that the Revolution's Government's actions in deporting these forces, forcefully divorcing Iranian women from their husbands, and dealing with these populist factions with utmost brutality, are all expressions of the Leadership's refusal to consider retrogression, or to surrender Iraq easily.
9. Every official, within his sphere of responsibility, shall gather the main reins, and control the activities of his subordinates.
10. Continue looking after the families of the martyrs who fell against the (rabble).
11. The student in his normal daily life, i.e. his daily life from the beginning of his scholastic year, must feel and be brought up to feel, that his biggest challenge is to succeed. That is, he must study and understand and hence succeed (pass his exams), and any intervention by the party must weaken his propensity for the opposite, in pursuit of this goal.
12. The need to constantly search for illuminating alternatives in our security work (we search for alternatives because human effort is always in quest of alternatives and is capable of finding them).
13. General Security must study every operation and identify the mistakes made in each, as well as the good points.
14. The lack of precision and the lack of ability in dealing with criminals results in major losses, whereas avoiding negligence in security work leads us to positive results and important information.
15. Faith, as I understand it, is thought coupled with a program that elevates society with regard to higher values and other principles and levels. We must act in an understanding and artistic way to reap benefits for the Revolution and the party, and even our practicing some aspects of worship are due to their being a widespread popular hobby, and we must go along with these wishes.
16. The employee we want is the one who is capable and modern, always able to develop in harmony with his other duties.
17. (The theory of) Capitalism is a condition that has been available to us from the beginning, as expressed to us by the minority of those involved in business and economics. In our avoidance of it, and our avoidance of Communism, we have chosen a theory born from the womb of the Nation, and from its suffering and its aspirations (I do not mean the theory of the ascendancy of religious fundamentalism), and that its working principles can be sacrificed for.
18. We believed that the activities of the security organs throughout the life of the Revolution had affected the lives of the citizens of Kurdistan, Basra, Najaf, and Al-Anbar, by driving them along the road of revolution, construction, and standing in the way of evil. We now see a need for revising their activities and methods, and for identifying mistakes and correcting them.
19. The relationship between the people of Iraq and the people of Egypt, and between the two countries on an official and popular level, is an excellent one. This strong and excellent relationship must be raised to higher levels, by confronting the evil emanating from the East.
20. In order for your work abroad to proceed normally and correctly, you must arm yourself with the party's ideas and ideals, and have an influence on the surroundings in which you live. Do whatever you please, provided that you serve the security duty to which you have been assigned.
21. Leadership, in the view of those espousing the purebred Baathist principles, is the dedication of their energies and efforts to the service of the Party and the Revolution, and the avoidance of reactionary values, for the Party has its own values and behavior.
22. Enhancing the presence of the specialized agencies - Intelligence, General Security, Military Police, Internal Security Forces - at passenger bus depots, some openly and others secretly. This matter is to be enforced, in order to limit citizens' movements as much as possible, movements which facilitate the speedy spread of news and rumors.
23. The placement of sharper eyes and surveillance on the Syrian regime's agents and its schemes, especially the plots of assassinations and bombings, whether individual or not individual.
24. The principle from which we launch our confrontation with our enemies, must be the feeling we give to the masses that we show no mercy for the opponents of the Revolution. Our stance in dealing with the rabble and in suppressing the wayward groupings must be shown as the way we must deal with those who are tempted. You, the Security organs, must expose the enemies' methods, bringing your information and facts up to date, and present them to the Baathists, spotlighting and exposing the foes' intentions, using both direct and indirect methods, based on whichever is most effective.
25. Our responsibility is not limited to employing our available energies. We must single out those who are faithful and find employment for them, leaving the opponents who supported the rabble at the mercy of unemployment and vagrancy, this being their due.
26. The most important way for us to discover our mistakes was our shock at seeing the rabble stand up against the Party and the Revolution -- we used to say that the most important element in our lives is the human being: we see him, we listen to him, we run to him. But reality has shown us this lesson, and the error of our comrades in implementing the slogan "With Life Without Commitment".
27. It is not always sufficient to correctly describe a desired condition we have passed through and improved upon. What we need is to correctly and accurately describe and know what we want to overcome, and to accurately visualize the alternative we desire.
28. The type who moves along with the overall movement is satisfactory to people; the type who is considered to be without kinetic energy and direction is unsatisfactory to people; the type who regenerates his energy and moves with additional speed and additional energy is the type who must be loved by the Iraqi soul.
29. The development of methods is reflected in results, and gives them forward progress. Thus any progress at the scientific level will be positively reflected on the special technical level.
30. During this stage we require the embodiment of the theory of work more than we need to talk about principles and their overall picture as such, for our Party's principles have been correct from the beginning, but they need to be replenished with living viable elements. We must also prepare the cadres and leaders who are capable of embodying decisions, and let the cadre which extinguished the rabble with manly forcefulness, be a living picture and model for all.
31. The party has taught us to respect time more properly, to organize our energies more effectively, and to sharpen our abilities to their sharpest penetration which cannot be attained except in a state of war, and to squeeze our minds to the utmost in serving our people and our country during peacetime.
32. A human being, even when all his physical energies are depleted, is not deprived of all his energies because the energy of the mind and the intellect are still able to produce, as they are an enormous boundless energy.
33. Anyone from the lower levels who contributes vital initiatives, earns the thanks of the people and the appreciation of higher level officials, in addition to the honor of a historical participation in the life of the great Iraq.
34. The psychological feeling, in an atmosphere of improving opinions, has a major positive effect on every individual, and based on this understanding, leadership elements must be concerned with their comrades' situations, both at work and in other fields.
35. It is necessary to foment differences amongst the splinter elements, based on the fact that the struggle between Arabs and Persians has taken an Iraqi aspect, in addition to the sectarian aspect.
36. We are required to be against disseminating religion by the state and in society, and we do not accept that Islam, as preached by Khomeini, can be an alternative to the Leading Baath. We must revert to our original beliefs.
37. The confrontation with the religious political phenomenon has been haphazard and lacking in vision and action, and we must admit that we have failed in it. We have however agreed to deal with this phenomenon by benefiting from the experiences of others, who have coexisted with it and succeeded in dispersing its black clouds. Such an attempted confrontation was carried out in Egypt with the Islamists (the Ikhwan), during the late Jamal Abdul-Nasser era and at the hands of his Intelligence Director, General Salah Nasr, and a program for dealing with them has been formulated since 1978.
38. We must guard against disunity among the people, who are made up of Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, etc., and consisting of Muslims and Christians. There are sects and groups amongst the Muslims, as there are sects and groups amongst the Christians, but this does not mean that our people are unique in having these colorings and sects. We are less than others in this regard, for there is no nation on Earth devoid of the divisions we have, in one form or another.
39. Opposites often meet when such a meeting targets the Arab Baath Socialist Party in Iraq. Thus, and based on this view, the Syrian regime's alliances have been entered into, against our Party and our Revolution.
40. We must move quickly to curb the tributaries flowing into the opposing forces' foundations, whether intellectual or behavioral. The best example would be to begin with the youth.
41. A wise man cannot adopt the role of an observer for the purpose of defense and attack, nor can a leader dash with his enemy without preparing a tributary for regenerating capability, compensating for potential losses, and supporting and dealing with weaknesses as they arise.
42. Religious reactionarism attempts infiltration through the social and economic foundations of society, and will also attempt to extend its tongue to any place of influence in our society.
43. We in the Leadership and the Party consider the factions that took up arms against us during the rabble, as being irresponsible and as having failed to comprehend the Leader Party's principles. Our articles in the Al-Thawra newspaper, in the aftermath of what they called their uprising, are sufficient for them, even if they did contain wounding and scratching of some of them, and we have received some blame from their mothers before them.
44. With regard to families which have suffered loss, there are Iraqi families who have had a son executed or an uncle imprisoned, making us responsible for him. It is our duty to correct their thinking by entering into discussions with them, to convince them of the justice of the decision, without allowing them to delude themselves that the party is being hypocritical in the maker.
45. Your behavior, in all its particulars, must be based on the respect for the individual's freedom, provided that he serves the Revolution in implementing its policies which serve its axiomatic principles.
46. In dealing with the control of the situation (if you do not devour the others, they will devour you), you must proceed first of all from your basic values. Our encounters with those who oppose us are clear and witnessed, as happened in the November retrogression in 1963 -1990 and others.
47. There is absolutely no Iraqi who believes in federalizing the Kurds, with the exception of foreign-lackey minorities. We must have unity of the Iraqis as a people, and the integrity of Iraqi soil and its sovereignty. It is your duty to stand against the anarchists in the South and the idiots in the North.
48. We have interpreted rights with an axiomatic interpretation, saying that they are interlinked with duties. He who does not perform his duties shall have his rights diminished in proportion to the decrease in his performance of his duties.
49. You must identify and observe the enemies of the Revolution and negative elements amongst the people. The skills and capabilities of Security directors shall be evaluated by the number of opposition elements arrested.
50. The Security organs are required to uncover opposing and servile behavior, and contribute to creating stature and fear of the Revolution in the hearts of those Iying in wait, to a point where their practices have been described as brutal and fascist. Iraq is today involved in a deadly war of advance and retreat with its enemies.
51. Mistakes by the Security organs, both now and in the coming stages, must be fewer than they were in the past. They must always be mentioned in relation to (the bogeyman), and must alter their behavior to become enforcers of punishment in their movement and pursuit of the inner lining of citizen's behavior, and that they possess, more than others, the authority and the means of uncovering hidden matters.
52. You must operate under two central slogans:
    1. Protect the Baathist principles to which the Founder Leader Michel Aflaq sacrificed himself and in which he ended his life.
    2. Use expedient measures as required, and depart when their time is over.
53. Avoid using social information in your possession as personal information for use outside the circle of total secrecy and your position's difficult tasks. This would result in major damage to the Party and the Revolution and its reputation. Do not forget that you are part of the people's Party and part of the people's great Revolution, and that you are targeted by sectors which are not to be discounted, which raised their necks during the rabble, and you saw what happened to some of you. I ask for caution, because the facts point to life or death.
54. The transient or temporary opponent must not divert you from the principal enemies, with whom we have been doing battle since the birth of the Revolution in 1968.

    The temporary opponents whom we have been facing since 1990 are a cloud that has dispersed, leaving a clear sky. It has become clear to those temporary opponents that we are their partners against our originally intended enemy. Thus our love for progress and their love for their interests, allow us to move forward together to bury the reactionaries and the rabble.

55. The easy ways and direct methods are not your principal path to uncovering the truth. Patience and precise work, and your constant readiness to defend the principles of the Revolution which has sated your hungry and enriched your poor.
56. Our new standard requires that the Baathist seize his opportunity, through his superior qualifications and his practical capabilities in his everyday work, thus expressing his fidelity to the Revolution's and Party's program and to his work duties, in the service of his comrades.
57. The shorter the time period between our discovering a negative circumstance and dealing with it, the more we would gain in protecting ourselves from our mistakes, and it is the most precious gain granted to us by heaven.
58. Enthusiasm and faith are two parallels. Constant precise diligent work is required from us, in addition to further knowledge. No matter how advanced a level of knowledge any one of us attains, he must seek more. More knowledge and more discipline based on faith, and I mean faith in the Leader Party's principles.
59. According to our comprehension, the Iraqi works well as long as the stick is close by him. However we must not forget to advise the avoidance of erroneous behavior in concert with others. We state that the Baath has its own new morals and behavior, which are called Baathist morals.
60. The ideal model is he who is truthful with his party, does not lie to the leadership, and who does not humor reactionary forces. We must amputate the treasonous families. Pursue them as was done to their brothers, and do not succumb to anyone's blame, for the protection of the Party is the most precious thing in existence.

1. The guidance, advice, and talks of the unique leader Saddam Hussain, and especially with regard to our security work, are major illuminations along the road to creating the new Iraqi individual, and basic keys to a new life in which rights and duties are clarified. We must absorb their meaning in the spirit of creativity, and translate them into behavior and action.
2. The true vision of the leadership of the Comrade Leader Saddam Hussain begins with a true vision of his stature, which is sometimes not ever-present to the senses, as in the eyes of children whose parents belong to a party or whose parents were killed by your honored hands, and who have been left as orphans. Show concern for all of them, especially those who are orphans. Teach them to love the Leader and the Revolution, and clarify to them the evil of their sons and brothers who committed treason. Let them damn them as they lie buried underground, and teach them that the pure air of Iraq is not deserved by anyone other than a Baathist.
3. The degree of awareness and educational and psychological building of the new Iraqi individual, especially after our clear victory over the evil thirty-strong forces in the second Gulf war, places us face to face with our massive historical responsibilities, since we have now discovered our previously unknown enemies who were working amongst us -- it is the (Nadhum Gzar) situation repeating itself; beware it, for it holds your life or your death. We must understand the party's theory on this, in which there are the means and the end in its pathfinding experiment and Revolution. We must implement its broad dimensions, for it expresses a unique situation of twisting the enemies' necks, as in the downfall of Nazism and Fascism which are still hated by all mankind.
4. Those who work in the Security organ have shown themselves to be worthy of the great attributes with which the Great Leader has honored them (the dedicated strugglers, the select, the faithful, the glorious). Some of them however, few though they may be, and according to comments reaching us from higher levels or as a result of our own observations, have behaved detrimentally toward the principles of the Party and its morality, in various directions and far from the law. Thus they are far from the exquisite picture in the Great Leader's mind, of his struggling striving sons, in that:
   1. Some employees of the Security organ have initiated relationships with business owners, contractors, and the wealthy who use the method of throwing parties and soirees in order to enter into relationships with Security personnel, to further their affairs and their designs.
   2. Entering into personal relationships with foreigners or Iraqis living abroad, without the knowledge of the office.
   3. Illegally interceding on behalf of some citizens, and intervening in affairs that are not related to Security work.
   4. Taking advantage of their work in this office by some personnel, to strike terror into the hearts of some citizens.
5. The leaking of information about the work of this office, especially in exchange for bribes which have become the norm, and openly talked about by the people.
6. Not dealing with negative situations, nor with the failures attributable to most personnel and which are covered up by their superiors. Thus the people have begun to see us as the symbol of evil and death and blood, and the terror bogeyman in the land.
7. The presentation of improper applications to some offices, in excess of legal entitlements, in exchange for a share with the applicant of the contracts or the allocation of property in or around the capital.
8. Overt patronizing by most of the organ's personnel, of hotels and public places, in a manner that is taunting to others. It may be a common trait among Security personnel to enjoy getting drunk, to frighten and terrorize others, and to fire a number of random shots into the air, and to seek recognition for such heroics.
9. Engaging in dishonorable relationships with some female citizens, whether they are part of our Security staff, or whether they are cooperators with us, or whether they are Baathist strugglers. There have been repeated incidents and scandals of this nature, and we have files about the matter which would block noses, especially the incidents which have taken place in places of incarceration and which have prompted the Leader President to order us to expel some of them abroad.
10. Discussing Security matters which are being sought, with the very person who is being interrogated about them.
11. The large number of rumors which are circulated by some personnel, which represent the rabble and the traitors as a beast intending to devour us soon or at an unknown time. They also circulate that each one of our homes shall be our grave, and that we shall eat of each others meat.
12. We reaffirm the need for considering the Leader President's guidelines to be a work program for the officers who interrogate the opposing parties' and groupings' elements and forces. The logic of cutting and uprooting must be used, in the spirit of the Leader's unshakable resolve. We must consider standardization as our fixed working method in interrogation, as follows:
    1. Confronting the hostile activities of the hostile movements and political parties cannot be achieved with a single link, but rather by a series of complementary links, beginning with getting to know the accused person (his life, his positions, his relationships, the doctrines of the movement to which he belongs, and the position of the west nations in relation to the movement or the groups, and the effectiveness of our pressure on them, and whether destroying them would incite the West against us or would they support us. We want to keep these circles from becoming annoyed with us, insinuating to them that the Fundamentalist movement is our common enemy with them, since it is opposed to peace and civilization. We must seek their approval until they lift the embargo on us.
    2. The interrogation of party and opposition gang elements is nothing but a science and an art at the same time. It demands that interrogators be experienced, having wide cultural capabilities, powers of observation, memory, and precision, and having had experience abroad. We prefer those who have studied in Yugoslavia, because of their extensive reading about the Communist party's confrontations with its enemies. It crushed their bones, or turned them into lunatics because they could not be in harmony with the party's theory. Thus, they were indefinitely confined to the beds of lunatic asylums. It is a good and unique experience obtained from others by our youth, in preserving security from a reactionary and treasonous group.
    3. The selection of competent interrogators for the interrogation of hostile elements, using frightening and terrifying psychological approaches, and methods which contribute to the speedy breakdown of the accused. Threaten him with violation of whatever he considers sacred, such as his honor, or with the killing of a loved one such as his son or his brother, in order to extract whatever we can from the interrogation. It is our job and our duty and our responsibility to the beloved symbolic glorious Leader Saddam Hussain.
    4. We have noticed that, in more than one directorate of Security, interrogations are lacking in the methods of combining softness with instilling fear, especially since the rabble and the traitors began to frighten our men by promising them their unavoidable destiny. These directorates used expedient methods in obtaining information from the accused, leading to their release from prison, which is going to cause us trouble in the future.
    5. We call upon the interrogator to exercise patience while interrogating arrested elements, to enable us to identify and define our enemies. Those who died as a result of interrogation methods are a loss, not because they are good citizens, but because we lost a link in our investigations which could have led us to their superior and his superiors. In fact, they were more patient than the interrogators even though they were facing death. Maybe it is the belief of those buried ones, that this is their cause in life.
    6. In light of the above, political interrogation of hostile subversive elements must take into account that they are sources of detailed information about the movements to which they belong.
    7. The most important event we are seeking is the elevation of interrogation to a level where it becomes an example, striking fear into traitors and informing our friends. This was the experience of Omar Abu Al-Nasr, the head of Egyptian Intelligence, in dealing with the Islamic Brotherhood: a lesson, an example, a method worth emulating in order to overcome reactionarism and to protect the Revolution's achievements. It also enables us to benefit from our previous security experiences in interrogating the hostile movements, parties, and gangs.
13. Since the Baathist is a means and an end to Baath, he must be convinced of his value, through the channels of indoctrination, follow-up, and the instilling of principles. He must be made aware of past experiences, whether by those who remember our plight after the November retrogression in 1963, or those who experienced the rabble of 1990. He must know that a large number of ignorant and illiterate sectors are unexpectedly demanding revenge on us, as a result of your activities. We and these sectors are in a racing struggle for initiatives, and we must hold the initiative, and dismember our enemies before they can overcome us. The circumstance of your Baathist struggling comrades at the hands of the savage rabble, is indescribable. Many were cut up and their bodies were never found. Let us keep one eye on the surveillance and pursuit of traitors, and the other on the tragic events that befell your brothers. Their blessed bodies were, sadly, carried away in the buckets of wheel loaders and placed with the garbage. Beware, beware.
14. At a time when the number of the organ's personnel is decreasing as a result of the Party's circumstances, we have noticed that most of the achievements of the past two years have been major in quality and quantity, earning the generosity of the Glorious Leader. The pressure you applied on the rabble and the events of your skirmishes with them, are an indication of the depth of your sacrifice and devotion, and those who dared to break down prison doors have been resumed to prisons that are more crowded and congested than before. The number of interrogation files has multiplied, thanks to your efforts and your dedication to protecting the Revolution and the Nation.
15. A security operation, in general, is a complex, intertwined, interlinked, multi-faceted operation, requiring clear and broad visions. It doesn't trouble us to say that the ones most accomplished and precise, are those who have graduated from the universities of London and Oxford University. Our war with Iran was the Spring of our intelligence science, as all the Western countries, including America, opened their doors to you, resulting in a period of development and learning and intelligence cooperation between us and them. Our enmity with Iran served us in a manner that was not expected by anyone, and it is known among the brothers who took part in security delegations that even the cost of their missions was willingly paid for by the Gulf states.
16. Continued education and enlightenment about the dimensions of the blessed Saddam's Qadisiya Battle, taking all its inspiring sufferings into account during this period that is being experienced by our people.
17. We reaffirm the need for dedication, sacrifice, and the speedy completion of work through the security operation's framework, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
18. We affirm the need for adhering to the Presidency Office guideline, requiring us not to respond at all to any letter or instruction or suggestion issued to you by the Security organs, whether by telephone or in person, to transfer or appoint or promote or discipline any government employee, in the event that such a letter or instruction or suggestion did not originate in the Ministry concerned. Such a matter should be raised to the Presidency.
19. On numerous occasions, and at all the annual periodic conferences, we stressed the subject of proper and correct dealing with our secret sources, and the need for constantly evaluating and testing them, while studying and carefully analyzing the information they give us from time to time.
20. The secret sources must be well followed up, and not forgotten in the event of rewards, in order to encourage them to provide a better output, in the service of our great Iraq. Terror and temptation is a successful method in security organs, and before they are bought by others, we must provide them with gratuities. This is recommended by the Leader during his secret sessions and meetings with Security and Intelligence personnel, especially after the treason committed by the rabble, which resulted in the men of the leadership losing their faith in many citizens whom we considered decent and defenders of the Party and the Revolution.
21. The hostile parties in general, which have allowed themselves to live in the mire of treason and depravity and servility to the foreigner, have shown us that patriotic feeling has died in the consciences and minds of their members, providing us with the opportunity to use the means and methods of sowing dissent and suspicion amongst their elements. This contains the size of the movement and buries their attempts at sabotage, nourishing division and strife within these parties and gangs. This requires coordination with the specialized units at Headquarters, where we have detailed studies and sufficient information in the form of organized archives: their numbers, their work files, the number of dead amongst them, and those who are incarcerated, whether sentenced or still under interrogation. This, in spite of the unease in our offices, which were their primary targets because they believe that it is the only office which clipped their nails and forced them to follow the wise Leadership in this precious land.
22. The use of all means to impel Kurdish pens to write, including our known internal and external sources, according to the subject and its importance, in a manner that is fair to, and insistent upon the national condition of Iraq. This achieves two purposes for us: the first provides a service to the Party and the Revolution; the second ensures the blockage of any possible path of retreat for them, that would return them to working among the saboteurs.
23. Giving special attention to the question of statements and leaflets being published by the hostile forces abroad, whether by tracking or by analysis and rebuttal, and by using some of them to sow discord and conflict among the hostile parties themselves, in coordination with the specialized units at the Directorate General. We tell you frankly that you must be clever in igniting discord among the parties and movements which are opposed to us, even more than the fire you light in their skins from the harsh lashes of your whips in extracting confessions and information. You have proven your superiority in interrogation and the killing of opponents abroad, so you must prove your ability to ignite discord and conflict between them.
24. Continuing to depend on accurate statistics and graphs, and the preparation of charts for all the hostile political movements, their leaders and their membership, in coordination with Headquarters.
25. Continuing to open special registers for the names of military people related to those who have been executed, and registers for the names of deserters and cowards and their families, and their influential relatives. Try to intimate to the families of some of those with whom we had a special situation and who have disappeared from existence, that they have fled to Iran.
26. It is not necessary for people to praise us for being nice to them; people should rather fear the swoop of your men, even if they talk about us as having hearts without pity, for this is unimportant. The important thing is the Party and its interests, which are above all else. Don't beat about the bush with people, for we and they are like boxers, to see who can deliver the knockout blow first.

    In the days of the rabble, the first blow was theirs and they ended up controlling most of the villages, the failure being ours, as determined by the Leader President. Had it not been for the valiant Republican Guard forces, and their use of all possible weapons, we would not be talking to you today, nor would we have a meeting or recommendations.

27. There is a tenet which says "be wary of calm weather", and this means that a man is killed on the day of his wedding. The security climate before the rabble indicated our control of all aspects of life in the land, whether political or economic or logistic or with regard to military drafting. It was a delusion for us to think that everyone supported us, because silence can be a wait for the right time to pounce, or it may be a scheming in darkness, for we have not yet been able to discover intentions. Therefore it is my view that one of our most successful methods is to taunt others, to expose what they conceal against us. Even if we make a mistake in bringing in a citizen and subject him to torture without reaching any conclusion with him in obtaining information, I say to you that we have benefited from him in that he will describe the way he was arrested and the methods to which he was subjected even though innocent, then how would it have been if he had a conspiratorial or treasonous mind. Such conspiracy shall be a horror screen before his eyes, giving him sleepless nights, making him distance himself from even thinking about politics or hostility to the Revolution. He will also flee from anyone around him who may have inclinations of this nature.
28. We ask all of you to use your friends and those who cooperate with you, in watching the enemies of the Revolution in the street and in the market and in public places. I am telling you that we have accurate information about your enemies whose capabilities have developed, and who are now capable of making foolproof plans against you. The events which have occurred against our country, whether they be the events of the North and the South, or the activities of the hostile parties, or the outbreak of the Iran and Kuwait wars, have all created special abilities among the people in this regard.

    If I may say so, we are moving in a tiring and wearying security medium, against which we plot and which plots against us. We have no choice but to adopt the methods which can expose some of what we don't know and fear, such as:

    1. Install listening devices aimed at your neighbors' homes, and inform your friends to do the same.
    2. Install recording devices on people's telephone calls.
    3. Give everyone you trust (a small, concealable pocket recorder) to steal what others are saying.
    4. Entrap some of those of whom you are suspicious, and subject them to strong and wearying interrogation, for you may obtain something from them which is unknown, such as a conspiracy against the Party or the Leader President.
29. We have received news warning us that information is reaching the civilian population, especially the families of prisoners, that their sons have been transferred from the Directorate of Security to such-and-such hospital and aren't we the ones who brought him to such a state. Another item mentions that a person has been transferred from Security to General Intelligence, and from there to Special Security or that he has been imprisoned in the dungeons of the Presidential palace. They also say that the Leader President was annoyed when a woman attempted to intercede with him regarding her husband, and told him about his being transferred. If we knew who leaked this information, we would place them together forever. I tell you, make it known that 70% or more of our prisoners will probably never again emerge into the light of day, after having betrayed the Party and the Revolution, and that their cells are preliminary graves for them and whoever divulges information about them.
30. Continue to affirm that Salahuddin University be given special status in terms of follow-up, since the hostile Kurdish movements and parties are still working for establishing bases there.
31. Work toward establishing sources inside the transportation depots in general, since they can be exploited by hostile forces in carrying out hostile acts of sabotage.
32. Banning the presence of hostile organizations within National Defense units, special units, and allied parties.
33. We reaffirm our previous instructions regarding the fugitive elements of the various hostile parties, about whom there is no information. Such elements must be catalogued and information about them must be followed up, and if it is established or suspected that any one of them is in a particular place, Headquarters must be informed in order to form the special assassination units, which had the leading role in carrying out their duties of pursuing the traitors and assassinating them, whether inside the Nation or outside it. Such missions were most successfully and capably accomplished, striking terror into our enemies. The events in Kuwait, Pakistan, and Sudan are but practical evidence and a lesson for our men in the carrying out of their duties. The pursuit of the Revolution's enemies is considered to be one of our most noble tasks, even though in the eyes of world opinion, they cost us something with regard to the Party's reputation and that of its fearless heroes.
34. Intensifying Security presence in residential complexes, such as using special patrols and sources cooperating with us, because these complexes will in the future become starting points for the internal cells of the saboteur gangs. We ask, in the light of the Leader President's instructions, that you establish a shadow in every house for its constant scrutiny, so that we may have them for lunch before they can have us for dinner. A Baathist must not be overcome, for his flesh and blood is from the Revolution, and he must therefore shed the blood of others for it, even if this costs him his own blood and his well-being.
35. Punitive action must be taken against residential complex dwellers, who are either known to be or we suspect them of, helping fugitive and hostile elements: seize their homes and banish them to wherever they may go, to become an example for others; their homes are to become the property of the Directorate General of Security.
36. Laying ambushes from time to time around the perimeters of residential complexes, in the event of attempted infiltration by subversive elements. Do not hesitate to open fire when arresting suspicious elements, to demonstrate our audacity. Reports shall be made about the incidents, and promotion shall be the reward for whoever is ardent in his work and who adheres to security procedures and discipline.
37. People living in these residential complexes are to be forbidden from carrying weapons within them. Severe and deterrent measures are to be taken against them.
38. Banning and forbidding every kind of party recruitment activity within residential complexes, regardless of its scope or nature. All are to be handed over to the specialized agencies, which shall take the appropriate measures against them to make examples of them. News of arrests is to be spread, thus spreading terror and fear amongst the others, and we have no objection to the release of one of them, after his arrest and torture, to enable him to tell others what befell them, thus throwing the deluded into disarray.
39. Continue following the instructions of the Northern Organizational Bureau, in coordination with Party organizations, in establishing registers of city and residential complex dwellers. All dwellers must be informed that they are required to register themselves and all members of their families, in addition to registering all their visitors. They must send lists about their visitors: name, place of residence, reason for the visit, whether or not he is a Party member . It is our goal that homes be like hotels, sending us a form identifying each arrival and each departure.
40. Continue following the instructions of the Northern Organizational Bureau, in preparing the Family Register forms which comprise detailed information about each family member, and whoever is permanently living with them in the same building.
41. Create suspicion around elements who might be won over by our enemies, nullifying them before they can be won over, by showing them to be on good terms with the Security organs or with the Party.
42. Visits are to be given exceptional and paramount importance, while staying away from platitudes. A detailed report shall be submitted about each visit, including a preliminary evaluation of the meeting, and recommendations for future dealings. This is to be considered a second race in our work.
43. The need for coordination amongst Directors of Security in the Governorates regarding documented aspects which are common to various Governorates, and the exchange of relevant information, to select the best methods and to use them in wiping out our opponents by any means. This can mean merciless beating to death, threats, indefinite incarceration, raping of their loved ones in their presence and in the presence of others, seizure of fixed and movable assets, and liquidation through murder by persons unknown, or by running over with cars.
44. It sometimes happens in some Governorates that minor incidents are hushed up and are not pursued in the proper way, leading to these minor incidents becoming more serious and more widespread - what is needed at this time is to follow up matters, no matter how minor. In fact it is our duty to magnify the small in order to expose much, and to incarcerate many and to frighten many. The enemies of the Party and the Revolution are not few in number, and we must always be on our guard, exposing them through any incident or by any means or any action. Do not permit our enemies even a dot to pass by without scrutiny; burden something with more than it can bear and you will get the unknown.
45. At the same time that we affirm the need for identifying and pursuing hostile elements and taking legal action against them, we also have no objection to informing their families at the time of their arrest or after the completion of their interrogation, for no reason other than to warn them and frighten them that this is one of them who has betrayed the Party and the Revolution and that they should disavow him.
46. Adherence to objective accuracy, avoiding either exaggeration and embellishment or minimizing, in dealing with such cases and incidents, reporting them accurately and without neglect. Security personnel must take this seriously, for otherwise they shall be considered to be in collaboration with the enemies and the wheel of the Revolution shall grind them, and they will be considered traitors and enemies of the Revolution and the Party.
47. Informing and coordinating with the Directorate of Residence regarding the matter of some hostile party elements using Egyptian and Jordanian passports in deploying their members, and to be aware of this. We regret that bribery plays a role in these matters. Some Police networks have been captured taking bribes for allowing many groups who were being sought by Security and Intelligence, to escape with false passports.
48. Having our sources follow up and attend hostile conferences abroad to make note of their presentations and their work, and to create differences amongst them. This is to include some of our student sources, who are to attend conferences and seminars conducted by student organizations abroad. Some of our personnel have made an effective presence in this field in the Socialist and West countries, and were rewarded and presented with gifts of appreciation, having infiltrated themselves in talented and precisely clever ways without being noticed by anyone..
49. It is not enough to adopt the defensive method of waiting for a hostile gang's internally-directed activities to occur before defeating them. We must turn to the offensive method by exploiting their poor situation, which has not yet stabilized in Syria, in order to undermine their leadership's positions, to affect their activities, and to weaken their relations with the Syrian regime and with the other hostile political movements.
50. Serious scrutiny of libraries, especially those belonging to universities, mosques, and places of worship. Banned books are to be quietly removed, by stealing them if necessary, to prevent hostile forces from using them, with the emphasis on Shiite literary books, and books which condemn the injustice of the Omayyads and their followers, who stood up to the early and latter Shiites.
51. Avoiding groundless and unplanned impulsive reaction to events, incidents, problems, and matters falling within your specializations, because this means a loss to us and to our principles. We must learn patience from the prisoners in our cells; they are Iraqis, but we find among them those whom we cannot annoy or embarrass. He is joyful at the calls for his execution, and proceeds with self-assurance, as if he were on his way to a recreation hall.
52. Some of our officers, nco's, and ranks are still talking about their office's secrets and its administrative and security duties, in front of their families and their friends and relatives. Since this has an adverse effect on the speaker and on the quality of his performance of his assigned duties, and on the security of the State, we ask you to regard this matter as a fundamental duty in eradicating this behavior. By adopting such terrible behavior, we have denigrated our principles to the point of becoming symbols of depravity.
53. We must also know what is behind the wall, and to determine the nature and inclinations of the hostile parties and their methods of operation, in order to attain the desired level of our work in reaching the farthest and most complex points of our enemies' thinking. This will enable us to abort all their despicable schemes, and to consolidate our clear victory which was achieved with the precious blood of our brave martyrs. The rabble stepped on their blood with their shoes and spat on it, out of spite and vengeance for their relatives who were executed by your blessed hands, and had it not been for your boldness in skinning the Revolution's and Party's enemies, we would have become relics of the past and forgotten.
54. We reaffirm the need for tapping all citizens' telephones. Submit the matter to us in detail including whatever methods are to be used, putting everything in writing. Do not hesitate to tap anyone's telephone, because the rabble of Najaf, Kerbala, Basra, and Amara have left us without trust of anyone. The land was raped and destroyed, and our most precious person, the Leader President, was insulted and his pictures were torn up.
55. We have noticed that some Directorates are requesting the delegation of some of their personnel, and asking for pardon for their having deserted, to use them in casting suspicion on hostile elements, especially those infiltrating from Iran. Such cases would have an adverse effect on us in the future and, as pointed out by the Leader President: Security must take into account that such situations may be fumed into double-agents which may harm us in the future, especially if he were allowed to return to Iran, assuming that he was not originally sent for this purpose. Be informed that we have proof that Iran's Intelligence has more depth and breadth and more patience than ours. We must expose and know our enemy.
56. In view of current requirements, we affirm the need for urging your sources and your personnel to gather accurate and objective information about persons wanted for questioning, without relying in this matter on information from Party organizations. This is in compliance with the Regional Secretariat Office's instructions comprising the orders of the Leader President, the Regional Secretary, whereby no information about persons is to be given out by the Party organizations to anyone except the Regional Secretariat's Office. It is known that our secret file contains evaluations of Party members, and any organ which penetrates our organization, administration, and membership has his current motives and interest in doing so, and this may have caused some pressure in some parts of the country. He must not be allowed to access that which is secret, and our view is correct, because most of those who fought against us during the rabble, were Baathist Party members armed with Party weapons.
57. Using our special patrols to confront the subversive patrols which are sometimes present on our territory. Detect them wherever they may be for they have been planted everywhere, in the North, in the South, in Baghdad, and even near your Directorate where we are now seated. It is our responsibility to provide and maintain security, and be informed that they are armies and you are armies, they are trained and you are trained, and you must precede them in taking the initiative in your hands.
58. Identifying and following up elements which cooperate with the subversive gangs, in the cities and the residential complexes. These hypocritical elements have troubled the Party and the Revolution and Security organs, since they hide behind the guise of the decent citizen. They had a shameful role in the war with Iran at a time when Iraq was doing its national and pan-national duty. They placed obstacles in the way of the fight, considering it to be between the Baath Party and the Khomeini Islamic Movement. They played a dangerous role in talking about the achievements of the Revolution and praising it, while saying, at least to their friends and families, that it was intermixed with ruthlessness and corruption.

    And since your organization is present within the families, by way of their older offspring and their smaller children, we were able to expose them and brought some mothers and fathers to trial. When they asked us, after confessing, about how we knew about their activities and their enmity to the Revolution, we told them that a wall has ears, and they could feel nothing but surprise at the Revolution's strength and the preservation of security within it. Some even fled abroad, in fear of walls. This is our faith in you, that you develop the methods of the Party and of the Revolution.

59. Pursuit of the remaining pockets and subversive patrols, while providing the military with accurate information about them.
60. Continued observation of the Takya supervisors and those who attend them, since the Dervish practices have been noticed spreading amongst the youth. We must send some of our men with them as infiltrators, to discover their locations. The actions of Mr. Izzat are along these lines.
61. Follow up the Revolution's enemies by pinpointing their addresses, in cooperation with the administrative units, and by sullying their reputations in the neighborhood, whether with regard to their honor or their past, keeping track of them with a view to entrapping them.
62. The need for continued work among the Security directorates in overlapping sectors, especially with regard to studying important operations they conduct, with a view to identifying their weak points, their ramifications, their circumstances, and their expected results.
63. Continued surveillance of in-country relatives of deportees, seeking information from the other Governorates if any of the families should move, in order to keep track of them.
64. You are aware of the importance of propaganda and its potential effects, to be carried out with precise objectivity, in order to abort the hostile parties' schemes.
65. One of the most important duties and centrally basic results which helped the Security organ in accomplishing its various assigned tasks, especially during the war, was its receptiveness and fruitful constructive cooperation with the other security agencies.
66. Continued revision of the negative information recorded against some people, and dealing with them in the light of their present stances; if they join us, there is no problem. If not, then continue their tracking and surveillance of them, searching for their mistakes even if these need to be concocted, in order to submit and humiliate them.
67. Utilize the enmeshed organizations by working through them to fan the differences and strife currently going on between the Kurdish Islamic movement and the agents of Iran, giving funds and equipment for deepening the differences between these parties.
68. In view of our expectation that Syria is going to become a principal center of hostile activity aimed at our struggling country, we must affirm the need for paying exceptional attention to it and to the activities of Syrian Intelligence and its intentions, and the parties based there. This is to be achieved through the gathering of information about them, by controlling border crossings and limiting infiltration.
69. Maintain relations with old elements of the Islamic Brotherhood and the Liberation Party, in order to learn the inclinations and intentions of these parties, and to work at aborting their subversive intentions.
70. Deploying our secret sources to discover the activities of the Al-Muneer group leaders, since there is the possibility of recruitment incursions into the country.
71. Exploit the changes taking place in the Communist countries to influence the convictions and leanings of Communist elements, including using them in Security matters, and convincing them that we are with them in our liberation direction, and in our negative view of the reactionary and mythical nature of religion.
72. Hostile organizations must not be allowed to broaden their bases through recruitment, and contain their efforts at retrieving their severed elements, including completely avoiding the entrapment of some citizens for having joined these parties.
73. Continue working in compliance with the instructions of the Northern Organizational Bureau in informing families that they must inform the relevant authority in the event of a split within the family as soon as it happens.
74. Continue using our sources in the search for saboteurs' weapons, and those left behind by the Iranian enemy in the wake of the heroic Al-Anfal operations.
75. Continue working through committees with the Turkish side, regarding Kurdish elements who have fled to our territory.
76. Attach importance to the Ibrahim Al-Khaleel transportation, since it is possible that some fugitive elements may infiltrate on Turkish trucks.
77. Evaluate the commanders of the special patrols in the Northern region from time to time, to determine their allegiances.
78. In view of the recent decisions allowing Kurds to own property in all the Governorates except Baghdad, Al-Ta'meem, Mosul, and Diyala, we affirm the need for taking inventory of the Kurdish families which have moved to the above Governorates. Gather information about them and pursue those who have negative marks against them, taking the head of the family immediately to the prisons of General Security and returning the family immediately to their places of residence. There is no objection to spreading the rumor that their head of family is to be executed, in order to frighten others from entering Baghdad or the other Governorates mentioned above.
79. Keep serious watch over male and female students living in hotels or boarding houses, lest these places be used as hideouts or meeting places by hostile elements. In case of suspicion and in the absence of documentary evidence to put pressure on them, rumors can be spread that this place is a den of immorality and is frequented by prostitutes, or that weapons have been hidden there, or that banned goods have been discovered there by Customs and Excise.
80. Continue taking the following into account when visiting the families of those executed, or sentenced, or who are fugitives:
    1. Programmed planning of the visit by completing all necessary information about the family to be visited.
    2. Taking necessary security measures as a precaution, prior to the visit, especially of some families known to have hostile leanings.
    3. Choosing the appropriate and suitable time for the visit.
    4. Determining at first hand the family's situation and Hs way of living, by breaking the psychological barrier between them and the Party and Revolution organs.
    5. Emphasizing the educational and integral aspects, by working at immunizing the family members against aberrant currents and malicious rumors.
    6. Identifying and selecting the elements which may be useful by putting them under the effects of temptation and terror. Lure their sons to places of entertainment which will distance them from the atmosphere of complexes and religious dogmatism, and allocate the expenses required for this. Prevent them from contacting their fathers' friends, and from frequenting places of worship such as Hussainiyas and mosques. Organize pleasure trips for them which coincide with Ashura' and the Forty and others. Regarding the terror aspect, remind them of their dead father's destiny and how he deprived himself and his family from the happy and contented life in the shade of the Party and the Revolution. Explain how he was ignorant and retarded and a reactionary, and was wooed by the reactionary hostile forces and groups.
81. Continue laying precise and accurate plans for the national and pan-national occasions, so that they may compete with the Shiite reactionary and mythical occasions, such as Ashura', the assassination of Imam Ali, the Forty of Imam Al-Hussain, Al-Ghadeer Festival, 15th of Sha'ban the birthday of their Missing One, the dates of birth and death of the Shiite Imams: Al-Sadiq, Al-Kadhum, Al-Ridha, and others. We must divert people's minds toward the Revolution's occasions, distancing them from the empty ideas of dogmatism, in order to imbue them with modern ideas and to control the security situation. This is to be done in advance of the targeted occasion, and is to become a regular practice, in order to foil hostile intentions.
82. Attaching major importance to the question of granting documents permitting the carrying of arms. We have noticed a recent increase in the number of applications for such documents, while there are large numbers which have not been returned. We therefore reaffirm recent instructions demanding a decrease in the applications for weapons licenses, limiting them to extremely necessary cases, and through Headquarters. We cannot hide from any of you that many of our comrades were killed with our weapons.
83. Timely preparation in advance of the hostile parties' special occasions, and laying plans for the effective aborting of their intended subversive activities in pointing out the faults of the Revolution and the Leader Party, and in exposing the graft and corruption engaged in by many of our Party comrades.
84. Continuing to observe religious visits and occasions, using cultural and propaganda interference on them. They are extinct and reactionary practices, out of tune with the Party's culture which has adopted secularism as its program, and has left the theologians by the wayside.
85. Paying special attention to information received regarding booby-trapped vehicles, wireless detonation, and suicidal elements entering the country, as these have wearied the Party and the Leadership.
86. We reaffirm the need for the security organs to move in on the student medium, from outside the university and institute campuses, while planting eyes for observing the activities of the hostile factions and parties, and by using our sources to hunt and entrap the stubborn ones. This is to be achieved even if it requires engaging in sexual acts, entering night clubs, or participating in drunkenness sessions, and even if it requires insinuation into their families or the families of the honorable Security personnel.
87. Paying special attention to our international boundaries, taking the necessary steps to curb hostile infiltration in coordination with the agencies concerned. Those involved must be educated with the Revolution's program, without reminding them of the international treaties which were signed by the Leader President and which were subsequently abrogated.
88. Identifying and following-up the broadcasting stations belonging to the hostile parties and gangs, and informing the Ministry of Culture and Information, in order to jam them.
89. In view of the present situation's requirements, and what we are seeing in the way of democratic changes at all levels, we affirm that this must not be exploited by the enemies of the Revolution in reversing our openness with others. Thus our previous order still stands, with regard to the iron-fisted control of citizens, the detention of any citizen, the investigation or search of his home, or his arrest, remain within the authority of the Security forces, the Intelligence bureaus, the Special Security, and Military Intelligence, without recourse to the criminal courts. This is in view of the critical nature of the situation, and for fear of losing security control, and remains in force until further notice.
90. Choosing the appropriate time to strike at the lines of recruitment of those who have subversive intentions, especially those who possess weapons and explosives, and in coordination with Headquarters.
91. Paying special attention to the pursuit and attack of any hostile groupings and their elements in the area of the Marshes. The Leadership does not want to create a new North in the South, and in fact it is possible to meet with the Kurds when there is a disagreement with them, even in the aftermath of vicious fighting. But in the case of the people of the South, and in view of their Shiite sectarianism, and reminding them of their bloody history with the governments they lived under, H is difficult to meet and discuss with them, especially if they are strong and have acquired a fighting foundation. They have a special impact on the people when they cite their primitive slogans about the Kerbala event, and when they ascribe the attributes of ruthless rulers to the wise leadership of the Party and the Revolution. Leaflets issued by their parties and movements reach us, as does all their propaganda about the descendants of Yawed and Abdullah Bin Ziyad and Al-Hajjaj, and all the persecution of the Prophet's family.
92. Coordination with government offices with a view to following up the employees who are responsible for the preparation of documents, identity cards, and stamps, for fear that they may be approached by some hostile elements.
93. With regard to the splinter gangs and the factions that affirm the spirit of splintering, they are the most dangerous of the factions which have adopted the ideas and grudges of the symbol of splintering (Syria's Hafedh Al-Asad). It is relevant to add that they are the greatest source of danger to national and pan-national security. Study and analyze the circumstances that helped the gang in its activities, and learn its history and personalities while setting aside the remainder who have resumed to the right path. Make great efforts in investigating them because they and the Syrian regime will surely vastly increase their hostile activities, and incite the movements and factions which claim to be pan-nationalist.
94. In order to discover the recruitment connections achieved by the splinter gang's leadership and which have not been severed with their current organizations, we must make use of all our available security methods to make the necessary security plans for foiling their schemes.
95. Continue updating the registers of Iraqi men who have married Syrian women and keep track of them, especially the women of the Alawi sect who belong, one way or another, to the Shiite sects which hold grudges against the Revolution, whether in Southern Iraq or Syria or Iran. Show the advanced cadres of the Party that the Alawis are not one of the Islamic sects. Rather, just as Hafedh's gang has splintered from the pure Arab way, so is the Alawi sect a group which has splintered from Islam and has crossed over to the side of blasphemy. This does not mean that we are concerned with studying the Islamic sects, but it is a political means and a way to disfigure the Syrian enemy who, through Hafedh Al-Asad's gang, has usurped power there.
96. Continue moving in on the Syrians who have acquired Iraqi citizenship, and keep them under observation, lest the lackey Syrian regime move in on them. Coordinate with them in the best interests of our security work.
97. Moving in on the smugglers who engage in smuggling across the border, and utilize them in obtaining precise information about the Syrian regime's activities, and about the other parties aimed at us, and to discover their instructions.
98. Keeping track of Iraqi truck drivers when they enter and leave the country, since they may be recruited by the hostile forces.
99. Continue the total ban on any organizational nucleus by the hostile parties and movements in the armed forces. Such organizations are to be struck secretly, in coordination with Headquarters and the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
100. Study the effects of negative cases which come to the surface, especially in the student and youth sectors, in preparation of reporting them to the Higher Authorities.

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